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Judicial Review - Professional Association - Inquiry
into Exclusion from Membership
Plaintiff, a dentist specializing in orthodontics; applied for
membership in certain orthodontics associations.• After his applica·
tion was rejected without reason: plaintiff sought an injunction to
require defendants to admit him as a member. The lower court
returned a judgment against plaintiff at the dose of his evidep(;e
on the basis that, in the absence of showing "economic neccessity"
for membership, he was not entitled to judicial review of the denial
of his application.• Held, reversed. Since membership in an ortl:t.o"
dontics association is a practical necessity for a dentist, a rejected ap- ·
plicant has a judicially enforceable right to have his application
considered in a manner comporting with fundamentals of due prbcess, including a showing of cause for rejection. Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 CaL
Rptr. 623 (1969) .5
The fundamental legal question presented in Pinsker is
.whether an individual, by showing that he may be deprived of
substantial economic advantages by exch1sion from membership "
in a professional association, can establish a right to judicial inter.
ven tion with respect to the denial of his application for membership; · ;,
This question itself poses an interesting dilemma for the judicillr)I
in jrs attempt to balance and reconcile conflicting group and indfoi.

•

1 Orthodontics is that branch of dentistry which deals with irregularitiespf
the teeth. One who practices OJrthodontics deals predominantly with children,
Boswell v. Boswell, 280 Ala. 53, 59, 189 So.2d 854, 859 (1966).
2 The defendants wer-e American Association
of Orthodontists (AA,O.), ·
Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (P.C.S.O.), Pacific Coast Society of Qrthci-,
dontists, Southern CompDnent (P .C.S.O.S.) , and various officers and comiµitt~
members of these. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 16(),
163, 460 P.2d 495, 496, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 n.l (1969).
" Upon his first application, plaintiff was informed that he was in partner·
ship with another dentist who was a non-member of the association. After separ:f'
tion of his patients from those of his pantner, plaintiff was again rejected with~
out reason. Id. at 164, 460 P.2d at 497, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
.
• At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, judgment was granted defenqants
pursuant to § 631.8 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which pr9vide~"'
that one party may move for a judgment at the close of the opposing parfy'il;
evidence without waiving his right to offer evidence in defense in the eveilt. th¢
motion is not granted. Id. at 166-67, 460 P.2d at 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 627 ., . . ·..
The lower court's decision in Pinsker was appealed to the California O>un
of Appeals. The appellate court, however, did not allow defendants to put oii
evidence in rebuttal. The supreme court held that pursuant to section 6lH.8. of
the California Code of Oivil Procedure, the situation was as if the motion
had not been granted, and the defendants had a right to offer their evideµce fi;(
rebuttal. Id. at 167, 460 P.2d at 500, 81 Cal. Rptl'. at 628. This was a sect$da.tj'
point in Pinsker, and is not considered in the body of this comment.
·
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dual interests. The scope of this comment will be confined to the
general approach which has been taken by the judiciary with emphasis on the way in which Pinsker is related to other recent decisions.
It has been established as a general rule in many jurisdictions
that voluntary associations have unlimited discretion to grant or
refuse membership, and that courts will not interfere even though
such an admission is arbitrarily denied." While this rule applies to
exclusion, it must be noted that there is a distinction between the
approach taken by courts with respect to exclusion from membership
and expulsion. Courts have been more prone to grant limited judicial review in cases of expulsion of members, where such expulsion
has been wrongfully or arbitrarily brought about.' Since the essential question being treated is an individual's right to membership,
it would be helpful to look first at the approach that courts have
taken with respect to expulsion from membership, as distinguished
from exclusion.
In granting limited judicial review to expulsion from membership, courts mainly have compelled re~_nstatement on two theories:
the property doctrine and the contract theory.• The property doctrine is based essentially upon the existence of some vested interest
of the complainant in the assets of the association.• For jurisdictional purposes, courts look to see if there has been a deprivation
of a property right as a result of the member's expulsion. Sufficient
property rights have been held to exist in case of an individual's
"See e.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th
Cir. 1957) (exclusion from medical association not violation of Sherman AntiTrust Act); Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 So.2d 225 (1943)
(failure to issue local charter not violatfon of first or fourteenth amendment);
Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956) (no liability for
excluding plaintiff from fraternal organfaation); Levy v. United States Grand
Lodge, J.O.S.B., 9 Misc. 633, 30 N.Y.S. 885- (Sup. Ct. 1894) (refusal to interfere
with internal questions of benevoJent association in absence of bad faith); McKane v. Dem.ocratic Gen. Gomm. 123 N.Y. 609, 25 N.E. 1057 (1890) (court
refused to enforce right o( a duly elected member of county political committee);
Kearns v. Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 A. 273 (1898) (equity without jurisdiction to
interfere with the .u::t of political committee); Hartis v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068
(Tex. Civ, App. 1920} (membership in voluntary association is privi1ege which
may be withheld at pleasure); State ~ rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medi·
cal Soc'y, 97 W. Va. 273, 124 S.:E. 826 (1924) (individual not entitled to compel
restoration to medical society when initial ele<;tion was erroneous; see note 31
infra;.
See gerierally Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 964 971-80 (1963).
• Note, Judicial Contrnl of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. R.tw.
983. 998-1002 (1968).
• 1d. at -999.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss4/8

2

Myers: Judicial Review--Professional Association--Inquiry into Exclusion

422

,l i

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

right to use the association's physical property'" or a member's
right to a pro-rata share of the association's assets in event of
dissolution." On rare occasions even a personal or pecuniary interest has been held sufficient.'~
The "contract" theory rests on the idea that the laws of an
organization constitute a contract between the member and the
organization." Under this view the courts will look to see if an association has acted in accordance with its rules; and also to determine if those rules violate public palicy.'"
The application of either of these theories to cases of exclusion
from membership is obviously inadequate. The "propertf' doctrine
cannot be applied by a non-member since he has yet to gain a
property interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the association's assets.
The "contract" theory is likewise inapplicable since no contractual
right has arisen between the prospective member and the association_ In any case, basing judicial intervention on the supposed existence of some contractual right is largely an illusory use of
rhetoric. In cases where judicial intervention has been justified on
this basis, it very easily could be justified on another more appropriate and sounder basis.'" Yet if a court is committed to the "con'"Davis v. Scher, 356
N.W.2d
Mich.137
291,(1959);
<:Y7
Hawkins v. Obrem·
ski, 227 N.Y. S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1%2); Heaton v. Hnl1, .51 App. Div. 126, 64
N.Y.S. 279 (Sup. Gt. 1900).
u Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y S. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
,.. See Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. App. 1947); (personal right of
membership, humiliation and injury to feelings due to expulsion) ; Joseph v.
Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 38 NJ. Super. 284, ll8 A.2d 696 (1955) (right to earn a
livelihood); Bax;r v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N·J.Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (I89'1:)
(right to practic7 _profession).
.
.
. .
"'Note, Jtulzcial Control of Actwm of Private Associations, 76 HAitv. L.
REV.
1001 (1963) .
983,
:>< Id. See Parsons v. North Cent. Ass'n., 271 F_ Supp. 65 (N.D., III. 1967);
Irwin v, Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So__ 600 (1930).;J Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff
County Medical Soc'y, 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (1938).
While judicial intervention has rested primarily upon the "contract" or
"property" theories, other cases have held that there is a judicial remedy
wlthout specifically relying U!)Oil such theoretical application. See Bernstein v.
A!ameda-Colllira Costa Medical Ass.'n, 139 CaJ. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (195~ ;
Smith v. Kern County Mediral Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P .2d 874 {194-2): Reid v.
Medical Soc'y, 156 N.Y.S. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915) 1;- Brown v. Harris County Medical
Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See also 41 MINN, L. REV. 212 (1957);
5 UTAH L. Rl!:v. 270 (1956) 1~ It would seem
that the application of set rules in these cases for the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, while lending itself to stability in the law,
will not always produoe a desirable ttSult. Courts might reach a fairer result in
a higher percentage of cases if they would sacrifice s.tab/i.Uty and look to the
partirular individuals, the particular organizations, and the particular facts
unique to each. case. This in essence is what the court did in Pinsker.
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tract" theory, judicial concern may be precluded because the
association's rules have been compiled with,'" or lead to situations
where a court would require strict compliance with an association's
rules even though other factors would point to judicial abstention."
It readily can be seen that, whether applied to expulsion or
exclusion, rigid adherence to some judicial doctrine such as the
"property" or "contract" doctrine in many instances does not reach
the desired result. In recognizing this problem, several courts have
indicated an increased sensitivity to the roles that professional
associations play in our society and the effect of denial of membership upon an individual. While these associations are normally voluntary,'" membership in a particular association is often essential
for one to conduct his trade or profession effectively. The control
exercised by such groups over the affairs of a particular profession
may make membership in these groups the only practical means of
influencing one's working environment... Thus, in placing more
emphasis on the aspect of control exercised by voluntary associations, a number of courts have departed from adherence to old
rules and have looked more to the particular facts of each case.
Through these cases there appears to be a realization of the significant role these organizations play, and looking at the facts of each
case, courts have taken into consideration the nature of that role,
the appropriateness of particular actions and policies to that role
and the interests of affected individua]s and the public at large...
Due to this increased emphasis on the interests of the individual and on public policy, the differences between cases of expulsion and exclusion, while still important, have diminished in
significance. The first indication of departure from judicial ab-

'"~See, e,g.~ West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Lewis, 17 Misc. 2d 94, 191
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
" Th1;1 "contract" theory has been critici:t.ed by several legal writers. See
Chafee, The Internal Affairs
Associations
of
Not For Profit, 43 HMtv; L. REV.
993 (1930) ; Note, Judicial Control of Acti= of Private AssociatiD?'ls 76 HARV.
L. REV, 983, 1002 (1963); Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Yolun·
tary Associatiorns, 65 YAIJ!. L.J. 369 (1956); 5 UTAH L. R.F.v. 270 (1956).
"'The involuntary aspect of these organizations has been recognized in some
cases and articles. See, e.g., Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical
Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d, 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1952). See alsa Ghafee, Supra Note 17.
19 For an interesting discussion of these factors see Tobriner and Grodin,
The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Iridustrial State,
55 CALIF. L. REV, 1247, 1254-55 (1967).
20 Id. at 1262-63.
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stention appeared in litigation involving labor unions," but it was·
not until the decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical
Society,"' that this increased sensitivity was reflected in cases invol.
ving professional associations. In Falcone, the plaintiff was denied
membership in the county medical society because he did not spend
four years at an AM.A. approved school. He had received a D.O.
degree from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy,"" and subsequently obtained an M.D. degree. The lower court held that:

J_:

j.::

'·
t

where an organization is in fact involuntary and/or is of
such a nature that the court should intervene to protect
the public, and where an exclusion results in a substantial
injury to a plaintiff, the court will grant relief, providing
that such exclusion was contrary to the organization's own
laws ... or the application of a particular law or laws of an
organization was contrary t.o public policy. _It follows that
each case must stand upon its own facts."

!

The court concluded that the me~ical society had virtual monopolistic control over the practice of medicine in that locality, and that
because of denying plaintiff membership, he was unable to use
hospital facilities. By virtue of this exclusion from membership,
the plaintiff was held to have suffered substantial injury.
In Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Society,"' the court relied heavily on the Falcone decision. In agreeing with that decision

!,

I

i;

"' For a discussion of the trend away from judicial abstention involving labor
unions see Summers, Union Powers
Workers
and
Rights, 49 MICH. L REv. 805
(1951) .
.. 34 N.J. 582; 170 A.2d 791 (1961), atrg, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d
324 (Sup. Ct. 1960) One early case often cited as evidence of judicial review in
cases of exclusion is Hillery v. Pedic Soc'y, 189 App. Div. 766, 179 N.Y.S. 62
(Sup. Gt. 1919). In that case plaintiff, a Negro, was duly elected to membership.
Subsequently, the society changed its by-laws in order to make its entrance
requirem·ent.s more stringent. The court held that the revision of the by-laws,
as applied to the plaintiff, was a nullity and that he was duly elected and still
a member.
.. Osteopathy is the system of medical practice based on the theory that
diseases are due chiefly to a loss of structural integrity in the tissues and that
the body is capable of making its own remedies against disease and other
toxic conditions when it is in normal structural relationship. It utilizes generally accepted physical, medicinal, and surgical methods of diagnosi.'l and therapy.
.Falcone v. Middlesex. County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 586, 170 A.2d 791, 794;
n.2 1961), affg 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960). This theory is not gen·
erally accepted by many in the medical profession, and recognition of osteopaths
as regular physicians has often been withheld. 34 N.f 582, 585, 170 A.2d 791, 793,
n.l (1961), aff'g 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960).
"'62 N.J. Super. 184, 197, 162 A.2d 324, 331 (1960), affd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d.
791 JI961).
·
96 Ariz. 240, 393 P 2d 926 (1964).
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and allowing a mandamus proceeding against defendants,"" the court
stated that while private groups should have the right to determine their own membership, this right does not extend to situations
where a medical society exercises control over a doctor's access to
hospital facilities as in Falcone. "[T]he society's exercise of a quasigovernmental power is the legitimate object of judicial concern.""'
The Pinsker decision, read in conjunction with Falcone and
Blende, manifests this rather recent evolution of judicial concern
over the increasing power of professional associations. In Pinsker
the court steered away from the requirement of showing an economic
necessity for membership. Since the associations exercise extensive
control over the specialty of orthodontics, membership in the defendant asssociations becomes a practical necessity. This is not
to say that the plaintiff would not have been able to be reasonably
successful in the practice of orthodontics without being a mem her
in the associations. However, he -suffered a loss of substantial economic advantages and damages to his reputation by being denied
membership. Thus, although in the past courts have sometimes distinguished between economic advantages and economic necessity,
the court in Pinsker did not do so. Probably the basic direction of
the Pinsker decision, however, concerns its emphasis on public policy
as a factor to be considered. In its opinion, the court stated that:"
Defendant associations hold themselves out to the public
and the dental profession generally as the sole organizations recognized by the ADA, which is itsell a virtual monopoly, to determine standards, both ethical and educational, for the practice and certification of orthodontics. Thus,
a public interest is shown,- and the associations must be
viewed as having a fiduciary responsibility with respect
to the acceptance or rejection of membership application.
In recent cases where membership has been compelled, particularly those cases remanded for further proceedings, public polity
reasons largely have been responsible for the departure from the
general rule of the past. Allegedly voluntary associations have
taken on many aspects of involuntariness in view of the tremendous
economic and political power which they possess. They are no
"''I'he court

mBleride, while not compelling admi.<sion to membership, did

.allow a mandamus proceeding requiring the lower court to hear the case in
accordance with the opinion. Jd. at - , 393 P .2d at 930.
"'Id. at - , 393 P .2d at 929.

"'Pinsker v. Pacific Coast SOc'y of· Orthodontists, l cal. 3d 160, 166, 460
P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, ff1:1 (1969).
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longer merely involved with areas which are solely private concerns.
They effect the public at large, and they also have an impact on
many indhriduals who are non-members but have sufficient relationships with these organizations to be substantially affected by
their actions. The public responsibility which has devolved upon
these organizations is obvious. This idea is perhaps best reflected
by the lower court in Falcone, where it stated: "The monopolistic
control ... of the practice of medicine ... necessarily catties with
it certain public responsibilities. It may not escape these responsibilities by designating itself as a private, voluntary association.''..
It should be cautioned that while emphasis has been placed up;
on recent decisions which have departed from the general rule,
there are still a substantial number of jurisdictions, including
West Virginia,"" which either still adhere to judicial abstention or
which have not had a recent opportunity to decide such a case. It
should also be empl).asized that judicial inquiry into exclusion from
membership has been confined to those voluntary association$
such as professional associations herein discussed, and has not been
extended to social dubs, religious organizations and fraternal associa"'Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 199, 1§2
A.2d 324, 332 (1960), aft'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
..
.. The case of State ex rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medical Soc'y, !l'7
w. Va. 273, 124 S.E. 826 (1924) , has been frequently cited in support of the
general rule that vo)untary associations have an :in.limited. right_ to. det_erutine
thei.r own membership. The only other West Virgm~a case m pomt is Snnp5911
v. Grand Int'd Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'r. 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S..E. 580 (191m;
cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919). While not directly concerned with exclUSi<>Il
or expulsion lirom a professional association, the more recent case of State ex rel,
Bmnaugh v. Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 568, 136 Si.E.2d 183
indica:•
(1964), gives an:
tion that the West Virginia court might consider requiring reinstatement of a
member of an organization if he was unjustly expelled. In Brana.ugh a regul:irty
licensed physician and su,rgeon was suspended from the st,tl'f of a pul>Iii';
· hospital with no reason given for his suspension. While it was emphasized tha.t
private hospitals have the right to exclude physicians, the court held this d<>¢$
not apply to public hospitals, so long as the physician COllfomJii to all ~ able rules and regulations. Id. at 572, 136 S.E.2d at 786. In reflecting it~
awareness of the role such organizations play, the court stated:
A physician or surgeon who is not permitted to practire his profession
in a hospital is, as a practical matter, denied the right to fully practice
his profession. Much of what a physician or surgeon must do in this
day of advanced medical technology can be done only in a hospital.
... Although one's right to practice medicine is not absolute and uniqualified, it is a valuable franchise afforded to one properly trained which
should be :reasonably protected.
,
Id. at 575, 136 S.E.2d at '187. (on the other hand), while it is clear the W~i
Virginia court will not hesitate to inter.rere in areas directly concerned with
the public interest, it is still not certain that it would judicially enforce one's
right to membership in a professional organization.
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tions which ate primarily pervaded by intimate social relationships"'
The external impact of exclusion from these organizations is largely
confined to exclusion of persons from sharing in these relationships,
traditionally a matter of only private concern.
It would appear, however, that the judicial trend with regard
to the problem of exclusion from membership is to view the facts
of each case individually, concentrating on the type of organization
and its purpose, the extent of control which it exercises and the
efffect on other individuals and the public.
Charles Blaine Myers, Jr.
31 Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46
Cal. R.ptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied; !184 U.S. 905 (1966); Kurk v. Medical Soc.'y,
260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Note, Judicially Compelled Admission to
Medieal Societies, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1186 (1962}.

Statutes - Vagueness of Phrase "Contributing to
Delinquency of a _Minor"
The defendant, Ralph Hodges, was convicted of contributing
to .the delinquency of a minor in the state of Oregon. He appealed
his conviction, contending that the statute under which he was
indicted violated the due. process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held, reversed and remanded. The statute was unconstitutionally vague and thus did not give, adequate notice of what conduct
was proscribed and consequently the judge and jury were allowed
so much leeway in its application that the law-making (legislative)
function was effectively delegated to them. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d
491 (Ore. 1969) .
The challenged section of the Oregon statute stated that "any
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any child
to become a delinquent child shall be punished upon conviction. .
."' "Delinquent child" is defined in a separate section -of the
When, a child is a delinquent child as defined by any statute of this
state, any person responsible for, or by any act encouraging, causing
or contributing to the delinquency of such a child, or any person who
by threats, coJILlllllnd or persuasion, endeavors to induce any child to per·
form any act or follow any course of conduct which would ca.use it to
become a delinquent child, or any person who does any act which
manifestly tends to cause any child to become a delinquent child,
shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000,
or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one
year or both, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not
exceeding five years.
ORE REv. SrAT. § 167.210 (1967).
1
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